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Today, multinational and domestic corporations in many indus-
tries are no longer self-contained vertical structures with permanent staff,
but increasingly are horizontal organizations with fissured employment
characteristics using outsourcing, franchising, and subcontracting with
contractors and chains of subcontractors. Too often, the workers of the
subcontractors uffer the consequences of the subcontractors' cost cutting
measures, work in unfavorable conditions, and have low wages and few
benefits, all for the purpose of serving the interests and profitability of the
primary corporation.
This paper therefore focuses on domestic laws that provide work-
ers with an additional avenue of remedy from an expanded employment
relationship-a doctrine of joint employer liability that places obligations
"up the chain" on the in-country originating contractor who benefits from
the supply chain or operates it for the benefit of the offshore multinational
corporation. Some form of this doctrine is already used to provide work-
ers with wage remedies against Chinese construction companies and to
provide dispatch workers wage and "employee" benefit remedies. Given
China's extensive role in multinational supply chains, this paper examines
the doctrine of joint employer liability up the chain and evaluates wheth-
er it can be expanded in China to remedy labor law violations and protect
workers in the labor supply chains.
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INTRODUCTION
China may soon realize that foreigners are once again ravishing its
citizens. While the ravishing is not directly done by foreign hands, it is
orchestrated by foreign investors. Foreign investors set up shop in China
and use their multinational corporations' (MNCs') labor supply chain
networks in ways that have Chinese contractors and subcontractors ulti-
mately inflicting the damage.
In the search for remedies, making MNCs liable for abusing work-
ers would result in their pushing the liability down the chain, through
their fissurization model,' in ways that ought to provide adequate rem-
edies to workers at the bottom of the chain. In the status quo, MNCs
shift legal liability by using contracts to establish employer and employee
legal relationships while using the workers of subcontracted labor chains
in foreign locations to supply their goods.' Many of the chain workers at
1. This describes the global phenomena of fragmented workplaces where em-
ployers use subcontracting, outsourcing, and franchising for formerly core operations.
See DAVID WELL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR SO MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); David Weil, Enforcing Labor Standards
in Fissured Workplaces: The US. Experience, 22 ECON. & LAB. REL. REV. 33 (2011).
2. A supply chain is the system that companies use to source and distribute
their products and services from origin to customer usually through subcontractors
and their workers. There are shifts in employment relationships as production pro-
cesses and distribution of control evolve within global production networks (GPN)
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the bottom levels of the subcontracted labor chains are underpaid and
work in substandard conditions in violation of domestic laws while the
MNCs benefit from of this global web of workers.3
In June 2016, the International Labour Organization (ILO) called
for the imposition of new legal remedies for labor supply workers world-
wide.4 Of course, Chinese labor laws and legal institutions should also
seek to protect Chinese workers. However, the current reality is that
some Chinese workers in the labor supply chain are not effectively
protected.
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) reported in
2016 that "60 per cent of global trade in the real economy is dependent
on the supply chains of our major corporations" and "[the global supply
chains of 50 companies] only employ six per cent of people in a direct
employment relationship."5  The ITUC notes these companies have
using multiple companies, including in overseas locations. Companies linked through
GPNs are related through various legal forms, with exchanges between firms struc-
tured so that transnational corporations (TNCs) do not legally own overseas subsid-
iaries or franchisees but only outsource production to them, thus shifting legal respon-
sibilities to the suppliers.
This production structure allows brands and retailers to drive coordi-
nated production of goods by capitalizing upon new technology, relaxed
regulatory frameworks and a supply of low wage labour in developing
countries. While brands and retailers do not carry out production, they
drive sourcing and production patterns overseas. This production model
has been characterized as a buyer-driven value chain.
INT'L TRADE UNION CONFED., PRECARIOUS WORK IN THE GAP GLOBAL VALUE
CHAIN 15 (2016).
3. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013:
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT 122 (2013):
About 60 per cent of global trade, which today amounts to more than
$20 trillion, consists of trade in intermediate goods and services that are
incorporated at various stages in the production process of goods and
services for final consumption. The fragmentation of production pro-
cesses and the international dispersion of tasks and activities within them
have led to the emergence of borderless production systems which may
be sequential chains or complex networks and which may be global, re-
gional or span only two countries. These systems are commonly referred
to as global value chains (GVCs).
4. Int'l Labour Org. [ILO], Fourth Item on the Agenda: Decent Work in Global
Supply Chains, ILC105-PR14-1-En (June 9, 2016), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/---ed norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms 489115.pdf [https://
perma.cc/78VN-4UTW] [hereinafter Decent Work in Supply Chains]. The UN Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) (Guiding Principle 2) under-
scores this need, stating all "States should set out clearly the expectation that all busi-
ness enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights
through-out their operations." This includes workers' rights in the supply chain. Int'l
Trade Union Confed., Global Supply Chains and Decent Work: Trade Union Input
to the G7, ITUC (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/tu paper for g7
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6GX-M7K7] [hereinafter Int'l Trade Union Confed.,
Global Supply Chains].
5. INT'L TRADE UNION CONFED., SCANDAL: INSIDE THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
OF 5o Top COMPANIES 4 (2016).
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"combined revenue of $3.4 trillion and the power to reduce inequality.
Instead they have built a business model on a massive hidden workforce
of 116 million people."6 The ITUC thus accuses the MNCs of corporate
greed in denying or ignoring workers' demands for a minimum wage. A
core demand from workers at ILO's 2016 "general discussion" on decent
work in global supply chains was that the conference agrees on the "need
to develop a legal standard which would include requirements that gov-
ernments hold companies based in their countries legally accountable for
treatment of their whole supply chain workforce, and to mandate 'due
diligence' by companies throughout their supply chains."'
This raises the issue: Who has and who should have legal responsi-
bility over the wages and welfare of the subcontracted labor supply chain
workers -the MNC or the subcontractor-employers who employ them?
Is there any justification for these beneficiaries of the labor supply chain
economies that operate as interrelated "enterprises" to have responsibil-
ity over their suppliers and the wages and benefits of the workers who
labor for them? Could there be joint employment and/or joint liability?
Under developing legal theories of joint employers and joint lia-
bility, MNCs and their suppliers could be held accountable.9 Emerging
6. INT'L TRADE UNION CONFED., New ITUC Report Exposes Hidden Workforce
of 116 Million in Global Supply Chains of Fifty Companies (Jan. 18, 2016), https://
www.ituc-csi.org/new-ituc-report-exposes-hidden [https://perma.cc/8XTV-7VBH].
7. ILO Supply Chains Debate a Test for Tackling Poverty, INT'L TRADE UNION
CONFED. (May 30, 2016), http://www.ituc-csi.org/ilo-supply-chains-debate-a-test
[https://perma.cc/ZB8U-5NC3].
8. The author recognizes this obligation may apply differently to labor supply
chains not configured as an "enterprise," but as a "search engine" buying from differ-
ent suppliers on an opportunistic basis. And, there are arguments that besides the
issue of responsibility, there are strong arguments to support offshoring. Offshoring
brings substantial benefits to the global economy, and the lion's share will likely go to
the U.S. economy." McKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, OFFSHORING: IS IT A WIN-WIN GAME?
15 (2003).
9. For an argument for joint liability, see JENNIFER GORDON, INT'L LAB. ORG.,
GLOBAL LABOUR RECRUITMENT IN A SUPPLY CHAIN CONTEXT I (2015). An argument for
joint liability is made as follows:
It is the firm at the top of the chain that makes the decision to structure
its enterprise through subcontracting relationships, usually because such
a structure allows the firm to lower its costs and risks. These savings are
largely the result of the firm's transfer of risk and legal liability for em-
ployment to its subcontractors, the lower wages and costs it achieves by
putting jobs out to bid, and its release from obligations to pay benefits.
At the same time, the firm retains functional control over the key aspects
of work it has contracted out to other companies, because it has the pow-
er to dictate their processes and fire them if they fail to meet its stan-
dards. Where control flows down the product/service supply chain from
the firm at the top, and financial benefit flows up to it, the argument goes,
some form of liability for the payment and treatment of the workers who
make the profits possible should follow .... The justification for applying
this approach to the labour supply chain... [is that] when an employer
decides to outsource its recruitment function, it reduces its costs while
retaining functional control. [The MNC] has the power to correct the
[Vol. 34:103
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global developments show some acceptance of joint liability at the
domestic level,0 and this Article explores whether joint liability is also
a possibility under Chinese law, particularly in dealing with the foreign
global labor supply chains operating in China.
This Article focuses on China especially, as China continues to be
a top global supply chain partner with global trade in the trillions of dol-
lars, and China is predicted to emerge as the world's largest economy
between 2020 and 2030.11
China is already the world's largest manufacturer, accounting for
nearly a quarter of global value added in this sector.... Even though
some production is moving to countries nearer its consumers, China
remains at the heart of a network known as Factory Asia. It has an
excellent infrastructure and an enormous, hard-working and skilled
workforce. Though wages are rising, its labour productivity is far
higher than that of India, Vietnam and other rivals, and is forecast to
keep growing at 6-7% a year to 2025.12
And yet, as wages in manufacturing increase, a possible labor short-
age looms. With China's working-age population declining from 900
to 700 million, and with its "Made in China 2025" policy of introduc-
ing robotization into the manufacturing industries, the impact on labor
and labor supply chains will be dramatic.3 Terry Gou, head of Foxconn,
problems in its recruitment chain by changing recruiters or demanding
more of its current one, and by paying more to cover the actual price of
its decisions.
Id. at 19 20.
10. Because these fissured work arrangements "often convolute chains of own-
ership and cloud lines of accountability" in Australia, it is asserted that the govern-
ment is looking beyond the traditional focus of liability of the contractual employer
and piercing the corporate veil to find liability. Tess Hardy & John Howe, Chain Re-
action:A Strategic Approach to Addressing Employment non-Compliance in Complex
Supply Chains, 57 J. INDUS. REL. 563,565 66 (2015).
11. Amita Jhangiani & Carl Stocking, China: Top Global Supply Chain Partner,
CHINA Bus. REV., Sept. Oct. 2006, at 78.
12. Still Made in China, ECONOMIST (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/special-report/21663332-chinese-manufacturing-remains-sec-
ond-none-still-made-china [https://perma.cc/NFS7-XUG5].
13. "According to the International Federation of Robotics, China will have
more installed manufacturing robots than any other country by 2017 and is expected
to deploy some 150,000 annually by 2018, more than three times the 44,000 robots
projected in the North American market that year." Supply Chain News: Now, Labor
Shortage Is Issue in China, as Global Manufacturing Trends Likely to See Major Shifts
in Coming Years, SUPPLY CHAIN DIG. (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.scdigest.com/ontar-
get/15-11-30-1.php?cid 9980&ctype content [https://perma.cc/H7UV-WVAK]. One
prediction suggests that man may come to assist robots rather than the opposite.
When thinking about the future of global supply chains, it is worth specu-
lating on truly revolutionary technological developments. One such pos-
sible development concerns Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM).
This has already produced a tectonic shift in manufacturing in high-wage
nations moving from a situation where machines helped workers make
things to a situation where workers help machines make things. Perhaps
manufacturing will be called "compufacturing in the future."
2017]
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claims that "within five years the 30% of [Foxconn's] labor force doing
the most tedious work will be replaced by robots, releasing them to do
something more valuable."'
14
For China and the companies that source from China, these chang-
es threaten the traditional manufacturing model. Kathy Chu and Bob
Davis of the Wall Street Journal recently wrote,
Over the coming decades, a labor shortage will force Western brands
to remake their China operations or pack up and leave. The changes
will mark a new chapter in the history of globalization, where auto-
mation is king, nearness to market is crucial and the lives of workers
and consumers around the world are once again scrambled."
While it is unclear whether a labor shortage and the impact of
robotization and digitalization will offset rising wages and displace the
need for large numbers of cheaply paid workers in the manufacturing
processes, one thing is certain: There will be a reconfiguration in many of
the traditional labor supply chains that have labor and economic issues
yet to be sorted out.
16
This Article therefore focuses on the extent to which this and other
legislative approaches might be possible in China. Part I discusses global
approaches directed at remedying labor violations in MNC labor sup-
ply chains both domestically and internationally. Part II describes labor
supply chains in China, China's current joint liability standards, and Chi-
na's guidelines for its overseas mining operations. Part III analyzes the
remedies possible in China to protect labor supply chain workers and
Richard Baldwin, Global Value Chains in a Changing World, in GLOBAL SUPPLY
CRAINS: WHY THEY EMERGED, WHY THEY MATTER, AND WHERE THEY ARE GOING 13, 46
(Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low eds., 2013) (citations omitted).
14. Still Made in China, supra note 12:
Kirk Yang of Barclays Bank, believes the manufacturing sector is moving
from "Made in China" to "Made by China." In the 1980s and 1990s most
factories were owned by firms from Taiwan (like Foxconn) or the West
(like Flex). Increasingly, he predicts, the sector will be run by Chinese
firms.
15. Kathy Chu & Bob Davis, As China's Workforce Dwindles, the World Scram-
bles for Alternatives, WALL ST. I (Nov. 23, 2015, 10:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/as-chinas-workforce-dwindles-the-world-scrambes-for-alternatives-1448293942
[https://perma.cc/Q728-FF56]. But see SHAHID YUSUF & KAORU NABESHIMA, CHANG-
ING THE INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY IN ASIA: THE IMPACT OF CHINA AND INDIA (2010), cited
with approval in Philip Schellekens, A Changing China: Implications for Developing
Countries, 118 ECON. PREMISE, May 2013, at 1, 7:
Indeed, the concern among lower-income countries is precisely that,
while China moves up the value chain and acquires new comparative
advantages, it continues to encapsulate within its borders the wage-sensi-
tive chunks of the cross-border supply chain. Thus, the fear is that China,
being a vast country of multiple regions with varying endowments, is not
only acquiring new comparative advantages, but also keeping its existing
ones, whereby China would straddle the full span of technologies and
labor intensities.
16. Mitali Das & Papa N'Diaye, Mitali Das and Papa N'Diaye, The End of
Cheap Labor, 50 FIN. & DEV. June 2013, at 34.
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the impacts on labor supply chains of the anticipated twin-force changes
of automation and declining labor supply. To conclude, Part IV suggests
remedial paths used in other countries that could work in China.
I. GLOBAL MODELS OF REMEDIES FOR CHAIN WORKERS
A. Internally-Directed Law: Domestic Laws Protecting Supply Chain
Workers of MNCs' Subcontractors
If there is a political will to provide labor protections to the work-
ers of subcontractors in the labor supply chains, the alternatives are many
and increasing. One option is for the workers' home countries to pass
and enforce protective legislation. However, domestic protective labor
laws may be politically unwelcomed, since they undermine national eco-
nomic goals to attract foreign investors with cheap labor and lax law
enforcement. In addition, domestic protective labor laws might not be
effective; even existing laws could not prevent disasters such as the Rana
Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh.
The current model of many MNCs is to use a fissured configura-
tion of contractors and workplaces in such a way as to maintain sufficient
control over its subordinate operations to preserve its core brand or
products, while at the same time avoiding direct responsibility and lia-
bility. 7 This shift of liability to the overseas chain contractors and their
employees creates problems when workers down the chain work in sub-
standard conditions, and are not paid, and local laws are not enforced.
The use of contracts to protect employers' interests is also carefully
monitored and limited by the MNCs due to MNCs wanting to maintain
sufficient control without. Thus, the use of non-legally-binding corporate
social responsibility provisions (CSRs)8 and codes of conduct contrasts
with the sophisticated legally binding contractual agreements hat pro-
tect intellectual property and minimize tax liabilities within the complex
system of labor supply chains.9
To better protect the employees in MNC supply chains, countries
could institute a joint liability regime for MNCs that exercise substan-
tial over their supply chains. Providing for "joint employers" and "joint
17. WEIL, supra note 1.
18. See Radu Mares, The Limits of Supply Chain Responsibility:A CriticalAnal-
ysis of Corporate Responsibility Instruments, 79 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 193 (2010).
19. See Andreas Schotter & Mary Teagarden, Protecting Intellectual Proper-
ty in China, MIT SLOAN MGML REV., Summer 2014, at 41; Leslie Benton, Protecting
Intellectual Property in Global Supply Chains, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 26, 2012),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2012/12/protecting-intellectual-property-in-glob-
al-supply-chains [https://perma.cc/7ABP-3VKG]; Ayako Hobbs, Guest Post: Tax Is-
sues in the Supply Chain, GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN L. BLOG (April 11, 2016), http://www.
globalsupplychainlawblog.com/international/guest-post-tax-issues-in-the-supply-
chain/#more-6263 [https://perma.cc/JKW4-FEY5]; Hau L. Lee & Pamela Passman,




PACIFIC BASIN LAW JO URNAL
liability" is a legal concept that expands the employment relationship
and inserts an additional responsible employer who is more likely able to
pay the absent wages. This is a legal concept used in many countries and
is typically implemented through legislation. For example, in the Unit-
ed States, the legal doctrine of joint employers with joint liability has
existed for some time under varying labor laws, often by finding "actual"
control of the workers by the host employer. Recent law has expanded
the concept to more easily find joint liability of employers, requiring only
a "potential" right to control rather than the more difficult standard of
"actual" control.20 This same issue, whether joint liability can similarly be
found under Chinese labor or contract laws and possibly be applied to
labor supply contracts, will be discussed below in Part II.
Moreover, there are models existing outside of China that expand
the employment relationship by use of joint liability regulations to pro-
vide remedies for labor violations. Likewise, China could use specific
legislation to make contractors jointly liable for the payment of wages by
their subcontractors.
Countries such as Australia, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany,
Austria, France, Norway, South Korea, and to some extent, the United
States, have addressed the dilemma of substandard labor conditions and
wages with specific domestic legislation mandating joint responsibility
in certain sectors of their economies.21 Other economically developed
countries outside China, such as Australia, Norway, Germany, France,
Austria, Spain, and South Korea, have directly regulated the contrac-
tor-subcontractor relationship on the domestic level, making contractors
jointly liable for wages of subcontractors' workers and sometimes even
for injuries in the case of labor supply chains.
22
20. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015); Board Is-
sues Decision in Browning-Ferris Industries, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD (Aug. 27 2015),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-issues-decision-browning-fer-
ris-industries [https://perma.cc/8NFG-P6WU]; Michael Lotito et al., NLRB Imposes
New "Indirect Control" Joint Employer Standard in Browning-Ferris, INSIGHT (Aug. 28
2015), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/nlrb-imposes-new-indi-
rect-control-joint-employer-standard-browning [https://perma.cc/J826-J629]; Michael
S. Pepperman & Alexander V. Batoff, Browning-Ferris: The NLRB Redefines Joint-Em-
ployer Status, HR LEGALIST (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/10/brown-
ing-ferris-the-nlrb-redefines-joint-employer-status [https://perma.cc/BZY3-SBLE].
21. The Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Austria, France, Norway, and South Ko-
rea; and, the U.S. (California) have adopted some legal mechanism of joint liability
between lead user companies, main contractors, and subcontractors. NAT'L EMP. LAW
PROJECT, CONTRACTED WORK POLICY OPTIONS 51 56 (2013). Australia also has levied
liability on a joint basis. Id. For commentary on Australia, see Hardy & Howe, supra
note 10. See also Richard Johnstone & Andrew Stewart, Swimming Against the Tide?
Australian Labour Regulation and The Fissured Workplace, 37 COMp. LAB. L. & PoLY I
55 (2015). In California, apparel brand companies are liable for payment of wages not
paid by their domestic contractors. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.).
22. NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, supra note 21.
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Australia legislatively mandates the joint and several liability of the
contractor and subcontractor for unpaid wages of the subcontractor's
workers.23 Norway requires the contractor to be a "guarantor" of the sub-
contractor's wages and overtime obligations.24 German law makes the
contractor liable for the failure of the subcontractor to comply with the
"minimum conditions of employment," and liability arises when offens-
es occur through a chain of subcontractors.2 In France, there is legal
responsibility of the client or contractor for violations of labor laws by
its subcontractor or by the subcontractors' subcontractors ("cascade sub-
contracting").26 Austria, like Norway, makes the contractor liable as a
23. Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Austl.):
(1) Each indirectly responsible entity (or the indirectly responsible entity,
if there is only one) is liable to pay the unpaid amount.... (3) If there
are 2 or more indirectly responsible entities, those entities are jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the unpaid amount. (4) Subject to
subsection 789CE(1A), this section does not affect the liability of the
responsible person to pay the unpaid amount.
Division 3 (Recovery of unpaid amounts) of Australia's Fair Work Act only ap-
plies to the textile, clothing, and footwear (TCF) industries. For commentary on Aus-
tralia, see Hardy & Howe, supra note 10. See also Johnstone & Stewart, supra note 21.
24. Act of 4 June 1993 [General Application Act] no. 58 § 13 (Nor.):
Contractors and subcontractors that contract out work or hire employees
shall be liable in the same way as an absolute guarantor for payment of
wages and overtime pay pursuant to general application of regulations
and accrued holiday pay, cf. the Act of 29 April 1988 No. 21 relating to
Holidays, to employees of the undertakings' subcontractors.
In line with its purpose, the act applies to all workers/employers.
25. An employer is liable if a contractor commissioned by the employer, or any
of that contractor's subcontractors, fail to ensure compliance with the minimum con-
ditions of employment. Within the meaning of the law, an employer is liable if, when
entering the contractual relationship with the contractor, the employer passes on or
fulfills a contractual obligation that already had arisen to a third party (client), or
who intends to use the contractor for fulfilling a contractual obligation which will
typically arise as part of that person's business model. It also applies in cases where
administrative offences are committed through a chain of subcontractors. This law
makes employers liable for the net wages of contracted employees in enumerated cat-
egories. Mindestlohngesetz [MiLoG] [Minimum Wage Act], Aug. 11, 2014, BGBL I at
1348, § 21, no. 2 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch milog/index.html
[https://perma.cc/FM3X-XR22]; Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz [AEntG] [Posting of
Workers Act],Apr. 20,2009, BGBL I, §§ 14,23 no. 2 (Ger.). See discussion in Employ-
er's Liability, BUNDESZOLLERWALTUNG [ZOLL] [GERMAN FEDERAL CUSTOMS SERVICE],
https://www.zoll.de/EN/Businesses/Work/Foreign-domiciled-employers-posting/Min-
imum-conditions-of-employment/Employers-liability/employers-liability node.html.
26. Loi 2014-790 du 10 juillet 2014 [Law 2014-790 of July 10, 2014 on the re-
inforced regulations on subcontracting under labor law] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RfiPUBLIQUE FRAN§AISE [10.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 11, 2014. The law
reinforces these provisions, particularly by reinforcing the responsibility of the client
or contractor in case of violation of labor laws by their subcontractors or subcontrac-
tors' subcontractors. The law "specifies the obligations of employers established out-
side France who post workers in France." Posting of Workers, EUR. LAB. L. NETWORK,
http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national %3Cbr%3Elabour law/national legisla-
tion/legslative developments/prm/109/v detail/id 5645/category 12/index.html
[https://perma.ccVQR7-RQRP]. Employers' obligations "include prior declaration
2017]
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"guarantor."2 Spain goes further, with legislation stating that the main
employer shall be jointly liable to their workers for the salary obligations
assumed by the contractors and subcontractors.2 In South Korea, the
law that applies to employers of construction workers makes the contrac-
tors jointly and severally liable for the subcontractor's unpaid wages.
29
of the planned posting, appointment of a representative in France and maintenance
of documents to be presented in case of inspection." Id. The law also specifies when
the contractor is responsible for failing to fulfill the above obligations and when con-
tractors incur sanctions for violating those obligations. Id. The law also defines the
duty of care and the responsibilities of the main contractor, key subcontractors, and
co-contractors. Id.
Decree No. 2015-364, published in the Official Journal on 31 March 2015
(page 5872) applies the provisions of Law No. 2014-790 of 10 July 2014
to fight unfair competition and to transpose Directive 2014/67/EU of
the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 related to the
transposition of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers.
Id.
27 ARBEITSVERTRAGSRECHT-ANPASSUNGSGESETZ [AVRAG] [EMPLOYMENT CON-
TRACT LAW ADAPTATION ACT] BGBL I, No. 459/1993, § 7 (c)(2) (2011) (Austria):
(1) Anyone who, within the scope of his/her entrepreneurial activities,
subcontracts at least part of the work he/she shall perform under a
project to a different entrepreneur (subcontractor) ... shall be a gener-
al contractor. (2) If the general contractor has subcontracted a project
or part of a project in a way that is unlawful..., he/she shall, pursuant
to Section 1355 of the General Civil Code (Allgemeines Btrgerliches
Gesetzbuch; ABGB), be liable as guarantor for the remuneration enti-
tlements determined by law, ordinance or collective agreement for the
workers employed by the subcontractor to carry out the work and to
which they are entitled within the scope of the agreed performance of
work. The same shall apply if a subcontractor unlawfully subcontracts
a project or part of a project. (3) Pursuant o Section 1356 ABGB, the
general contractor shall be liable as deficiency guarantor for entitlements
to the remuneration determined by law, ordinance or collective agree-
ment for the workers employed by the subcontractor to carry out work
at construction sites....
28. Workers' Statute art. 42 (2) (B.O.E. 1995, 75) (Spain):
The main employer shall jointly respond for the salary obligations as-
sumed by the contractors and subcontractors with their workers and
those referring to Social Security during the period of validity of such
contract during the year following the termination of his/her job order,
unless the interval previously set forth with respect to Social Security has
elapsed.
See also Workers' Statute art. 1 (4) (B.O.E. 1995, 75) (Spain):
Spanish [labor] law shall be applicable to the work rendered by Spanish
workers contracted in Spain at the service of Spanish companies abroad,
without restriction to the public regulations that may be applicable to
the workplace. Said workers shall enjoy at least he economic rights that
would correspond to them had they been working in Spanish territory.
29. This Act only applies to construction workers/employers.
If a project in the construction industry is carried out through two or
more tiers of contracts under subparagraph 11 of Article 2 of the Frame-
work Act on the Construction Industry (hereinafter referred to as "con-
struction contracts") and its subcontractor who is not a constructor under
subparagraph 7 of Article 2 of the same Act fails to pay wages (limited to
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Finally, in the United States, California has a statute making certain that
contractors in the apparel industry are jointly liable for the wages of their
subcontractors.
30
Other labor laws may have legal mechanisms to protect chain
workers the same way they protect all workers. For example, in the Unit-
ed States, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeks to deter wage and
hour violations of workers in a chain of operation with a "hot cargo"
provision that permits the Department of Labor to enjoin the transpor-
tation, shipment, delivery, or sale across tate lines of goods produced by
any employee who has not been paid minimum wage or overtime in an
accordance with the FLSA.
31
Contracts, like legislation, can also expand liability. For example,
collective bargaining agreements can secure joint liability. Such agree-
ments, referred to as "jobbers" agreements, were common in the early
1900s garment industry in New York, where joint liability was negoti-
ated among outsourcing companies and their contractors and unions in
order to counter the declining wages and working conditions of the gar-
ment workers.32 The "jobbers" agreements are similar to the modern-day
wages incurred for the construction work concerned) to a worker it has
employed, the immediate upper tier contractor shall take responsibility
for paying wages to the worker employed by the subcontractor, jointly
with the subcontractor.
The Labor Standards Act, Act. No. 5309, Mar. 13,1997, art. 44-2 (S. Kor.), translat-
ed in MINISTRY OF EMPLOYMENT AND LAB., REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LABOR LAWS OF KOREA
450 (2014).
30. In California, apparel brand companies are liable for payment of wages not
paid by their domestic contractors. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West, Westlaw through
2016 Reg. Sess.). See also, Hina Shah, Broadening Low-Wage Workers'Access to Jus-
tice: Guaranteeing Unpaid Wages in Targeted Industries, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
19 (2010) (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 26731.1 as evidence that California enacted a wage
guarantee system in the garment industry). A small inroad on the ability of contrac-
tors to shift liability down the chain in the construction industry is found in CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2782(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation). Since 2013, under Cali-
fornia law, provisions in construction contracts whereby a downstream contractor or
subcontractor indemnifies an owner or upstream contractor against liability caused
by the upstream indemnitee's "sole negligence or willful misconduct" are unenforce-
able. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782(a) (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation). Thus, the
attempted shift of liability from up the chain to down the chain is barred with the
upstream contractor/owner's liability limited to only sole negligence or willful mis-
conduct. John R. Heisse, Robert A. James & Chris R. Rodriguez, Shifting of Liability
Nixed by New California Contractor's Law, PILLSBURY L. (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.
pillsburylaw.com/publications/shifting-of-liability-nixed-by-new-california-contrac-
tors-law [https://perma.cc/KHH9-7NPC].
31. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(1) (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 114-318 to 114-327). For jurisdictional purposes, perhaps there could be a
minimum dollar threshold like the $100 million threshold in California's Transparency
in Supply Chains Act. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (2013).
32. See Mark Anner et al., Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply Chains:
Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting Net-
works, 35 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y 1 1, 3 4,24 25 (2013) [hereinafter Anner et al., Toward
Joint Liability], for an excellent discussion of a broad array of approaches to find joint
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version of collective bargaining provisions or international framework
agreements used to negotiate joint liability.
33
Another approach used to promote better labor practices is for the
MNC to, voluntarily or by legislative mandate, require contractor suppli-
ers in the chain to provide a payment bond that guarantees payment of
required labor law obligations by the contractor to its workers and the
subcontractors' workers.34 A related protection, common in most of the
United States, is to have mechanics lien legislation to prevent workers
from not being paid by the contractor, wherein the worker would have a
property interest in the goods worked on until paid.35 Ensuring payment
liability in global supply chains.). See also, Mark Anner et al., Buyer Power, Pricing
Practices, and Labor Outcomes in Global Supply Chains (Univ. of Colo. at Boulder,
Inst. of Behav. Sci., Institutions Program Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2012-11,
2012), http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/pubs/pec/inst20l2-0011.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F2E5-2YFT].
33. See Sarah Coleman, Enforcing International Framework Agreements in US.
Courts, 41 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 601 (2010). Rudiger Krause, Session IV En-
forcing European Corporate Commitments to Freedom of Association by Legal and
Industrial Action: The European Perspective: International Framework Agreements as
Instrument[s] for the Legal Enforcement of Freedom of Association and Collective
Bargaining? The German Case, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 749 (2012). Felix Hadwiger,
Global Framework Agreements: Achieving Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, 7
INT'L J. LAB. RES. 75 (2015).
34. See Ronald C. Brown, FTAs that Also Protect Workers: Expanding the Reach
of Social Dimension Provisions on Labor to Promote, Compel, and Implement ILO
Core Labor Standards, in EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE EN-
TERPRISE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 109 (Ales et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Brown,
FTAs that Protect Workers]. In California, apparel brand companies are liable for
payment of wages not paid by their domestic contractors. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1
(West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.). See also Liability of Manufacturers and
Contractors, N.Y. LAB. L. § 345-A (2014).
35. A mechanic's lien is a security interest in the title to property for the benefit
of those who have supplied labor or materials that improve the property. The lien
exists for both real property and personal property. More specifically, a mechanic's
lien is
A security interest that may be acquired in property by someone who
spends material or labor working on that property. A mechanic's lien
usually stays in effect until the lien holder gets paid for services provided.
The failure to pay for services as agreed may allow the lien holder to
keep possession of the property involved .... To prevent confusion, other
names may be used for the same concept (e.g., construction lien, laborer's
lien, artisan's lien, supplier's lien, garageman's lien, materialman's lien,
and design professional's lien).
Mechanic's Lien, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/mechanics lien [https://perma.cc/BJ83-8RYZ].
One expert suggests the difference in the U.S. generally, as follows.
If you're unpaid on a state, county, municipal, government or federal con-
struction project you're allowed to file a bond claim, and not a mechanics
lien claim against the project's bond.... Even when a payment bond is
placed on a private construction project, your right to file a mechanics
lien claim is usually still in-tact. The only difference is that the lien will
get "bonded off" soon after you file.
Scott Wolfe Jr., Mechanics Lien Claim or Bond Claim? Which Should You File?,
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of laborers and improving their treatment can therefore be a normal and
socially responsible cost of business as well as a "fulfillment of promises"
beyond the often illusory CSRs and Codes of Conduct.
B. Externally-Directed Law: Foreign Laws Affecting MNCs' Overseas
Operations
A country can also regulate a domiciled MNC's domestic and over-
seas activities. Recent domestic regulations in the United States have
affected MNCs' overseas joint responsibilities under various statutes
operating at the domestic level.36 Some labor laws affecting or poten-
tially affecting overseas labor activities have mandated the reporting of
the names of overseas subcontractors used by MNCs and have banned
foreign importation of goods produced by prison, child, or slave labor.
37
There is also the possibility of using domestic laws with extra-territorial
application, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and cer-
tain civil rights laws,38 to directly regulate overseas MNCs' activities.39
ZLEIN (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.zlien.com/articles/mechanics-lien-claim-or-bond-
claim-which-should-you-file [https://perma.cc/CFA7-EZLC].
36. An analogous approach of using domestic legislation in the areas outside of
labor, except where it might overlap with human rights issues, has been described as
follows:
Domestic supply chain-related regulation is an avenue by which home
states can potentially set environmental and human rights-related norms
for third-party suppliers and their host governments via multinational
companies. These regulations not only affect companies; they also serve
as an alternative to international law for shaping the behavior of host
governments. Under pressure from third-party suppliers, developing
countries may pass legislation and strengthen their ule of law in order
to prevent global companies from shifting their supply chains to other
regions.
Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419,
420 (2015).
37 The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1714.43 (2013), for example, requires companies to disclose what efforts and audit-
ing procedures they conduct o prevent human trafficking in supply chains.
38. See, e.g., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91
Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006));
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)) ("ADA"). See U.S.
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, Opinion Letter on Enforcement Guidance on Ap-
plication of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Conduct Overseas
and to Foreign Employers Discriminating in the United States (Oct. 20,1993), https://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/extraterritorial-vii-ada.html [https://perma.cc/DG2M-
R92J] [hereinafter EEOC, Enforcement Guidance].
39. See Sarfaty, supra note 36, at 420. The EU has been critical of the U.S. use of
extraterritorial legislation. Professor Scott examines the global reach of EU law in the
context of the use of global regulatory power. While the enactment of extraterritorial
legislation by the EU is extremely rare, the author states that the EU may use it to
"to galvanize third country or global action to tackle transboundary problems and to
pursue objectives that have been internationally agreed upon." Joanne Scott, Extra-
territoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. I OF CoMp. L. 87, 87 (2013).
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More recently, in 2015, the United States Government took a
lead in regulating specific areas of supply chains of federal contrac-
tors.40 Government contractors are now being asked to effectively police
their supply chains in order to address, among other risks, counterfeit
parts, human trafficking, business ethics, and cyber threats. The rule that
seeks to eliminate human trafficking mandates the creation of proce-
dures to effectively address the trafficking risk through monitoring the
supply chain.41 Prime contractors are primarily responsible for conduct-
ing adequate due diligence on potential suppliers and for the award and
administration of subcontracts in support of the prime contract, and
penalties for supply chain violations include the exclusion of contrac-
tors from government contracting.42 Perhaps a similar legal standard of
due diligence could be created for ensuring the payment of wages to the
workers of subcontractors.
43
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, beginning in Jan-
uary 2012, requires certain companies to report on their specific actions
to eradicate slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains44:
Aimed at mid-size and large retailers and manufacturing companies
with worldwide annual revenues of $100 million or more, the law's
chief goal is to ensure companies provide consumers with infor-
mation that enables them to understand which ones manage their
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) made arguments in a recent
meeting of G-7 leaders that the issue should be addressed by legislation at the home
and destination of the MNC. Int'l Trade Union Confed., Global Supply Chains, supra
note 4.
40. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Requirements Relat-
ing to Supply Chain Risk (DFARS Case 2012-D050), 56 Fed. Reg. 210 (Oct. 30, 2015)
(to be codified at 48 C.ER. pts. 202,208,212 15,233,239,244,252). Effective March 2,
2015, the new mandates come from the just-released Federal Acquisition Regulation
provisions that stem from the September 25, 2012, Executive Order 13627, "Strength-
ening Protections Against Trafficking in Persons in Federal Contracts." Cynthia L.
Cordes, US. Government Requires All Companies with a Federal Contract o Comply




41. The federal government now requires all companies with a government
contract for supplies or services obtained outside the United States with a value over
$500,000 to comply with newly-enacted human trafficking regulations. "These reg-
ulations impact over 300,000 contractors nationwide and countless subcontractors.
Companies and prime contractors are now on the hook to take responsibility for their
subcontractors and independent agents. The era of getting by without knowledge of
how, or by what means, subcontractors obtain labor is over." Cordes, supra note 40.
42. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR SUPPLY CHAIN TOOLKIT, STEPTOE & JOHNSON
LLP 1, 7 (2016).
43. See Human Rights in Supply Chains: A Call for a Binding Global Stan-
dard on Due Diligence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 30, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2016/05/30/human-rights-supply-chains/call-binding-globa-standard-due-dii-
gence [https://perma.cc/B99Y-P8SU].
44. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010; CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1714.43(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 legislation).
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supply chains responsibly .... Specifically, the law requires a com-
pany to disclose on its website its initiatives to eradicate slavery and
human trafficking from its direct supply chain for the goods offered
for sale. A company must disclose to what extent it: (1) engages in
verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of
human trafficking and slavery; (2) conducts audits of suppliers; (3)
requires direct supplies [sic] to certify that materials incorporated
into the product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human
trafficking of the countries in which they are doing business; (4)
maintains accountability standards and procedures for employees or
contractors that fail to meet company standards regarding slavery
and human trafficking; and (5) provides employees and management
training on slavery and human trafficking.4
Another related legal concept put forward is to expand tort liability
to MNCs for overseas workplace harms that occur under the operations
of their outsourced contractors.
46
To China's credit, in 2015 it initiated voluntary, non-legally-bind-
ing extra-territorial labor requirements for its overseas companies and
their chain suppliers for treatment of workers, specifically within the min-
ing industry. The guidelines were promulgated in Guidelines for Social
Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments and they call for due
diligence in maintaining a global mining supply chain and they include
standards that seek to align supply chains with ILO core labor standards
on value chain management, human rights, labor issues, and occupation-
al health and safety.
47
45. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, Bureau of Int'l Lab.
Aff., U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/ilab/child-forced-labor/California-Trans-
parency-in-Supply-Chains-Act.htm [https://perma.cc/7DK4-XDN2]. It is estimated
that the reporting requirement will impact about 3,200 companies headquartered in
California or doing business in the state. See also VERIT , COMPLIANCE IS NOT ENOUGH:
BEST PRACTICES IN RESPONDING TO THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS
ACT 3 (2011). For suggestions on how investors can go beyond mere compliance, see
Effective Supply Chain Accountability: Investor Guidance on Implementation of The
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act and Beyond, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP.
RESP. (Nov. 2011), http://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/2011SupplyChainGuide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82D3-63YD].
46. Naima Farrell, Note, Accountability for Outsourced Torts: Expanding
Brands' Duty of Care for Workplace Harms Committed Abroad, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L.
1491 (2013). The note
proposes a limited expansion of the current U.S. employment-based li-
ability regime to hold multinational firms, or "brands," to a duty of rea-
sonable care to prevent violations of core labor standards throughout
their global supply chains. Under this framework, a brand that purchased
goods or services that were produced in violation of certain fundamental
labor standards would be liable if the brand had notice of the violations,
had power to deter them, and failed to take reasonable steps to do so.
Id. at 1494. There was a contrary holding in the Ninth Circuit where the Ninth
Circuit denied negligence claims by foreign workers against a Wal-Mart for labor vio-
lations committed by foreign contractors. Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677,
684 (9th Cir. 2009).
47 It is reported that "Chinese outbound investment has been rapidly
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C. International Obligations Under ILO Standards, Free Trade
Agreements, and OECD Guidelines
While the author acknowledges and urges the use of obligations
in free trade agreements, OECD Guidelines, and ILO labor standards,
these approaches and remedies are supplemental and beyond the intend-
ed scope of this paper.
4
1
II. FINDING CHINAS LEGAL STANDARD FOR MNC RESPONSIBILITY
A. China and Labor Supply Chains
Global supply chains have transformed the world. They revolu-
tionized development options facing poor nations; now they can join
supply chains rather than having to invest decades in building their own.
The offshoring of labor-intensive manufacturing stages and the atten-
dant international mobility of technology launched era-defining growth
in emerging markets, a change that fosters and is fostered by domestic
policy reform. This reversal of fortunes constitutes perhaps the most
momentous global economic change in the last 100 years. Global supply
chains, however, are themselves rapidly evolving.
49
However, in the wake of these developments, too many subcon-
tracted workers in the domestic labor pools of the labor supply chain
are underpaid and work in substandard working conditions.5 Alleged
increasing to over $100 billion in 2013. The extractive sector, claimed $24.8 billion in
2013, dominates Chinese outbound investment in non-service sectors." Yifan Song,
China's Resource Governance Leadership, ESTELLE LEVIN (Jun. 10, 2015), http://www.
estellelevin.com/chinas-resource-governance-leadership [https://perma.cc/P9FK-
5RJ7]. Though the Guidelines appear to be legally non-binding, it may be an indica-
tion of China's apparent willingness to embrace ILO standards in its overseas business
arrangements. The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemicals
Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) that issued the Guidelines pledged to assist, eval-
uate, and report on companies' performance. Id. Its relationship with the Chinese
government is unclear. The labor provisions can be found at CHINA CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE OF METALS, MINERALS & CHEMICALS IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS, GUIDELINES FOR
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN OUTBOUND MINING INVESTMENTS 33 38, http://www.estel-
lelevin.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CCCMC Guidelines for Social Respon-
sibility in Outbound Mining Operations EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6F6-UXCM]
[hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY].
48. For discussion, see Ronald C. Brown, China US. Implementation of ILO
Standards by BITs and Pieces (FTAs), in FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR RIGHTS IN CHINA
LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION AND CULTURAL LOGIC (Ulla Liukkunen & Yifeng Chen eds.,
2016); Ronald C. Brown, Fostering Labor Rights in a Global Economy: The Efficacy of
the Emergent US Model Trade and Investment Frameworks to Advance International
Labor Standards in Bangladesh, 155 INT'L LAB. REV. 50 (2016); Ronald C. Brown, FTAs
in Asia-Pacific: "Next Generation" of Social Dimension Provisions on Labor?, 26 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 69 (2016); Brown, FTAs that Protect Workers, supra note 34; Ron-
ald C. Brown, Mega-Regionalism: TPP Labor Provisions: A Game Changer? (East-
West Center Workshop on Mega-Regionalism, Working Paper 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract 2745524 [https://perma.cc/UH9F-2RH3].
49. See Baldwin, supra note 13, at 13.
50. A study by Professor Bill Taylor showed labor standards "do decline down
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violations of China's labor protection laws and harsh conditions by con-
tractors in the China labor supply chains are regularly cataloged and
often reported in the media, involving MNCs such as Apple and Foxconn.
China Labor Watch in a recent study compiled areas of common viola-
tions by subcontractors, including toxic working conditions, long work
hours and excessive overtime, as well as failure to pay for workers' social
insurance, work injury insurance, and other insurances required by law.5'
Many of the officials of the MNCs say they have been working
to improve the labor conditions of the subcontracted workers through
codes of conduct, corporate social responsibility, and inspections, but
worker advocates argue they are ineffective and not legally binding. In
2015, Apple Inc.'s Chief Executive Tim Cook, who was instrumental in
setting up its supply chain in China, reportedly said he was "outraged"
by reports of unsafe working conditions at companies that make Apple
products2: "We care about every worker in our worldwide supply chain
[and] any accident is deeply troubling, and any issue with working condi-
tions is cause for concern."3 Cook also said the company inspects more
factories every year and has made a great deal of progress and improved
conditions for hundreds of thousands of workers: "We know of no one
in our industry doing as much as we are, in as many places, touching as
many people."4
Yet, when labor conditions remain substandard, who should be
responsible? Should it be the Chinese contractors cutting corners on the
labor law obligations? Or should it be the contracting party up the chain,
i.e. the MNC or its Chinese contractors who may have "squeezed" the
subcontractors for the lowest cost, anticipating that labor standards may
have to be compromised to meet the contract? Should both have some
responsibility? This article argues that contractors and subcontractors
should bear joint responsibility for the treatment of workers in their sup-
ply chains.
the hierarchy of the supply chain, and decline is relative to ownership," and that "[s]
upply chain strategies, ownership form and industry are all determinants of the rela-
tionship." Bill Taylor, Supply Chains and Labor Standards in China, 41 PERSONNEL
REV. 552, 566 (2012). His study showed the size of the subcontractor employer in the
labor supply chain did not provide a determinative basis for predicting labor standard
violations and he concluded "there is no uniform or single deterministic relationship
between supply chains and labor standards." Id. at 566. See also Anner et al., Toward
Joint Liability, supra note 32.
51. Beyond Foxconn: Deplorable Working Conditions Characterize Apple's En-
tire Supply Chain, CHINA LAB. WATCH (Jun. 272012), http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/
report/62 [https://perma.cc/5PXG-NM23].
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B. Legislative Joint Responsibility: Dispatch Workers and the
Construction Industry
In China, acceptance of joint responsibility as a legal concept under
existing laws between contractors and subcontractors is illustrated in two
sectors and arguably could be found under applications of other labor
laws. Under recent legislation in China regulating the use of dispatch
workers, labor violations of the workers can render either or both the
user and the sender jointly liable for wages and benefits.55 Likewise, in
the construction industry in China, contractors and subcontractors can be
held jointly liable for wages and often for workers' injuries.56 A further
issue to examine is whether joint liability can be found under other Chi-
nese laws and possibly apply to labor contracts in the labor supply chain.
57
In China, the new Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch workers
amending the Labor Contract Law (LCL) authorizes joint employer lia-
bility for violations by the labor dispatch service employer or the host
company employer using the dispatched workers. Any violation of the
55. FANG L. COOKE & RONALD BROWN, INT'L LABOUR ORG. [ILO], THE REGULA-
TION OF NON-STANDARD FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA, JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA (2015); see also Ronald C. Brown, Chinese "Workers Without Benefits," 15
U. RICHMOND J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. L.J. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Brown, Workers Without
Benefits].
56. The Labor Contract Law and a construction law should render the workers
of the subcontractors entitled to a labor contract and the protections of the labor
laws. However, due to the use of "independent contractors" and illegal middlemen,
and failure to provide required labor contracts, they most often fall outside those pro-
tections, but are covered by Contract Law; and as discussed subsequently can render
the contractor up-the-chain jointly liable with the middleman-subcontractor. Brown,
Workers Without Benefits, supra note 55, at 52 n.158; Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar.
15, 1999), art. 2 (China).
57 Since China has a Civil Law legal system, the inquiry is whether there is oth-
er legislation that allows for a "joint employer responsibility" application/interpreta-
tion? The Labor Contract Law distinguishes between workers with contracts for labor
and those with labor contracts, with only the latter entitled to the full protections of the
labor laws and the former, as independent contractors, entitled primarily to contract
claims in the courts. RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW IN CHINA 30 33 (2009) [hereinafter BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT LAW]. See Dawu Hu, The Criteria for Employment Relationship in China 1,
4, (unpublished article), https://www.upf.edu/documents/3298481/3410076/2013-LL-
RNConf Dawu.pdf/cbbdd09l-9b68-40fd-a33b-e3ac4e4al64b [https://perma.cc/D8YJ-
BHL7]. While it seems clear there are available legal doctrines to find the immediate
employer of an apparent independent contractor liable for wages and possibly work
injuries, there is no clear path, absent a clear showing of control, to finding employers
"up the chain" liable as joint employers. The terms for employer vary in different
labor legislation. See BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra,
at 25 29. This would militate in favor of specific legislation holding those employers
jointly responsible for the injuries of their subcontractors.
58. China Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch, HRONE, http://www.hrone.
com/article/-China-Interim-Provisions-on-Labor-Dispatch [https://perma.cc/MK4Q-
KZF5]. On December 28, 2012, the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress issued the Decision on Amending the People's Republic of China Labour
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LCL and the relevant interim provisions concerning labor dispatch by
a labor dispatch service provider or an employer shall be dealt with in
accordance with Article 92 of the LCL. 9 Article 92 provides that when a
labor dispatch agency violates the LCL, both the host company and the
dispatch agency "shall bear joint and several liability of compensation"
for any damage caused to he dispatched workers.60
Joint liability is also used to regulate China's construction indus-
try. In this case, liability can flow up the supply chain for workers of
the subcontractors to recover wages from the contractors. The subcon-
tractors commonly contract and subcontract their work, creating further
subcontracting chains with each contractor paid at a lower rate with
the difference being pocketed; in the end, the workers of the last con-
tractor are paid at the lowest rates. This is especially significant since
China's construction industry comprises a substantial part of China's
GDP and often involves many projects with long chains of contractors
and subcontractors.
61
These contractors, as employers, must meet the legal requirements
of business and licensing down the chain. Construction laws require that
the workers they hire be in a formal employment relationship, with enti-
tlement to a labor contract as well as social security benefits and labor
law protections.62 However, it has become an accepted practice to break
the chain of legal business contractors and insert a person or entity that
lacks the required legal credentials to conduct business. This person is
usually called a "baogongtou. '63 The baogongtou hires workers who,
because of its non-"employer" status, are not considered "employees,"
Contract Law (effective from July 1, 2013), and in January 2014, the Ministry of Hu-
man Resources and Social Security of China issued the Interim Regulations on La-
bour Dispatch (effective from March 1, 2014) [hereafter Interim Regulations].
59. Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2007), art. 20 (China) [hereinaf-
ter Labor Contract Law]. For discussion of newly emerging cases, see Grace Yang,
China Labor Dispatch Rules: Why Did You Ever Think It Would Be Easy?, CHINA
L. BLOG (July 18, 2016), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2016/07/china-labor-dispatch-
rules-why-did-you-ever-think-it-would-be-easy.html [https://perma.cc/FR6V-4Y3N].
60. Labor Contract Law, supra note 59, art. 92. Likewise, Article 94 provides
for joint or several liability. Where an individual that contracts for the operation of a
business recruits workers in violation of the provisions of this Law, thus causing losses
to the workers, the organization giving out the contract and the individual contractor
shall bear joint and several liability for compensation. Id. art 94; see also Ka Ni Li,
Re-Conceptualizing the Notion of "Employer": The Case of Labor Dispatch Workers
in China, 40 BROOK. I INT'L L. 619, 633 34 (2014).
61. Pun Ngai & Lu Huilin,A Culture of Violence: The Labor Subcontracting Sys-
tem and Collective Action by Construction workers in Post-Socialist China, 64 CHINA I
143,144 (2010). See also Brown, Workers Without Benefits, supra note 55.
62. For an excellent and detailed exposition of the law and practices in this area,
see the recent and yet unpublished dissertation of University of Cologne graduate
student, Pilar Czoske, Protection of Workers' Rights in the Chinese Building Industry
(on file with author).
63. Id.
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but independent contractors performing contractual employment
services. As such, these workers, usually migrant workers, have only con-
tractual claims to wages and must often go to court to enforce their rights.
Wage disputes are common in the construction industry, and many
workers in the broken chains are not really sure who their employer
is (other than the baogongtou who orders the work). Predictably, the
upper chain contractors want the baogongtou to assume the role of the
construction worker's employer in order to negate their own employer
responsibilities. While a de facto employment relationship with upper
level contractors could be argued to exist, it will more likely be found
to be an informal relationship outside the LCL. But under provisions
issued by Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) in 2005, where
the construction company has illegally sub-contracted parts of its obliga-
tions to a baogongtou, the construction company would have to "bear the
employer entity responsibility for workers."6 4 This is confirmed in Arti-
cle 94 of the LCL.6 5
Likewise, by law in China's Guangdong province, if a baogongtou
does not pay the employees' wages, "the employing entity that pro-
vides the project" has to assume the payment of wages.66 The regulation
states that if a construction company has failed to pay the agreed con-
struction funds and thus causes the failure of the construction workers'
wage payment, the company is liable to pay wages up to the amount that
remains unpaid.67
A form of joint liability is also found in legislation regarding work-
ers' injuries, where a worker of the subcontractor can go back up the
chain to find liability.68 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social
64. Guanyu Queli Laodong Guanxi Youguan Shixiang de Tongzhi (Q±tXA
X)W9Q$ iii Jti;A) [Notice Regarding the Relevant Points of Establishing Em-
ployment Relations], (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, May
25, 2005, http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/ldgxs/LDGXzhengcefagui/LDGXzyzc/201107/
t20110728 86296.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5L3-PE48] (China). Provision 5 states that
labor arbitration committees have jurisdiction over such disputed claims. Id.
65. Labor Contract Law, supra note 59, art. 94. Art. 94 of the Labor Contract
Law regulates that individual contractors that are not qualified to serve as employers
according to labor laws (namely the "baogongtou") has to assume a joint liability
for any damages caused to the employee that was hired by the individual contractor
together with the entity or company that contracted the individual contractor.
66. Art. 32 of the Regulation of Guangdong Province on the Payment of Wages
further regulates that after having paid the wages, he (the liable contractor) is entitled
to claim the paid sum from the 'baogongtou.' Regulation of Guangdong Province on
the Payment of Wages (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Jan.
19, 2005), art. 32 (China).
67 Id. art. 33.
68. See Supreme People's Court Provisions on Several Issues Relating to Trial
of Workplace Injury Insurance Administrative Cases (adopted by the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court Adjudication Comm., Apr. 21, 2014), art. 3 (China):Where social insurance
administrative departments find that the following work units bear workplace injury
insurance responsibility, the people's courts should sustain: (2) Where employees dis-
patched by a labor dispatch unit are injured or killed while working at the employing
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Security (MOHRSS) specifies that if an employee hired by a baogong-
tou suffers a work-related injury, the construction entity that is legally
qualified to officially engage employees but has outsourced its employ-
er responsibilities to a baogongtou must assume the liabilities under the
work-related injury insurance.69
C. "Guidelines" and China's Overseas "Good Citizen Employer"
MNCs care about their public image, as their public image affects
their commercial success. Some MNCs also sincerely seek to ensure that
the workers in their labor supply chains are treated well under foreign
labor laws. However, although MNC-initiated internal codes of conduct
and social responsibility requirements are prevalent and often reflect the
external standards of the ILO or OECD, internal codes are almost always
voluntary, not legally binding, and lack a real grievance mechanism.
Sometimes guidelines specify good labor and employment practic-
es by employers operating overseas. For example, in China, the China
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and Chemicals Importers
and Exporters (CCCMC) promulgated the Guidelines for Social Respon-
sibility in Outbound Mining Investments, which require due diligence in
its global mining supply chain, including standards that seek to align
with the ILO's core labor standards on value chain management, human
rights, labor issues, and occupational health and safety.70 Article 2.4, for
work unity, the dispatching unit is the unit that bears workplace injury insurance re-
sponsibility. (3) Where an employee assigned by a unit to work in another unit is
injured of dies, the assigning unit is the unit that bears workplace injury insurance
responsibility. Id.
69. Zhixing ( Gongshang Baoxian Tiaoli)) Ruogan Wenti de Yijian (tAIT CE
f{ . IfJ)) 1J~lW]FJt9, ) [Opinions on the Implementation of the Work-Relat-
ed Injury Insurance] (promulgated by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security, Apr. 25, 2013), at no. 7, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-05/03/content-2395049.
htm [https://perma.cc/W9MW-GKSZ] (China). China's Tort law confirms that liabil-
ity. If a worker is subjected to work-related injury, liabilities for damages caused by
the accident are allocated between parties in accordance with the principle of fault
liability. "If the party providing labor services causes any harm to himself as the result
of the labor services, both parties shall assume corresponding liabilities according to
their respective faults." Tort Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art.
35, para. 2, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file id 182630 [https://perma.cc/
AE3H-6WU7]; see Hu, supra note 57, at 1, 4; see generally Gongshang Baoxian Tiaoli
(2010 Xiuding) ( [Regulation on Work-Related Injury In-
surance] (promulgated by St. Council of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 27 2003,
amended Dec. 20, 2010), art. 2, CLI.2.142905(EN) (Lawinfochina).
70. Though the Guidelines appear to be legally non-binding, it may be an in-
dication of China's apparent willingness to embrace ILO standards in its overseas
business arrangements. The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and
Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) that issued the Guidelines pledged
to assist, evaluate, and report on companies' performance. Song, supra note 47. The
labor provisions can be found GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 47
at33 38.
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example, outlines requirements relating to "Labor Issues,"'" and calls
for the banning the use of child labor, providing equal employment and
non-discriminative opportunity, paying minimum wages and overtime,
and establishing a collective bargaining mechanism.2
The Guidelines section on "Value Chain Management" also re-
quires not only the Chinese companies, but also the first-tier suppliers, to
adhere to guidelines and enforce them in their supply chains. 3 Likewise,
guidelines insist that chain contractors agree to a voluntary code of con-
duct embracing the guidelines and providing for due diligence.7 4
It would seem China could therefore get credit as a "good citizen
employer" for specifically addressing the labor supply chains' labor issues
in this overseas sector. However, in reality, the non-binding guidelines
do not differ much from other MNCs' codes of conduct and CSR provi-
sions in providing meaningful labor rights for the labor supply workers.
Again, one wonders if a similar set of legally binding guidelines could be
fashioned for foreign MNCs coming into China, obligating them as guar-
antors of the contractors and subcontractors in the labor supply chain to
promote the payment of wages and decent working conditions, thus pro-
viding workers, especially those without labor contracts, another remedy.
III. ANALYSIS
A. What Is Workable in China? Capturing Legal Standards with
Remedies
There is a growing consciousness within China, as evidenced by its
new Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments,
that it is good policy to not allow Chinese overseas employers to exploit
workers in a foreign country. So perhaps the Chinese might consider
whether it also should have improved enforcement of its own domestic
laws to better protect its own supply chain workers from similar exploita-
tion in the absence of the MNC's home government (e.g., the U.S., EU)
passing similar guidelines? Or, perhaps the Chinese government would
consider initiating legislation to curb abusive labor practices involving
foreign labor supply chain systems. Guidelines, though non-binding,
can still attempt to direct good conduct by employers operating over-
seas regarding labor and employment practices. For example, in China
the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments
71. GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 47 at 34 36.
72. Id. at 36 38. It provides for grievances without retaliation, but there are no
procedures. Id. at 38.
73. Id. at 33.
74. Id. Article 2.3.4 of the guidelines requires due diligence as follows: "Compa-
nies that are engaged in upstream activities of mineral development e.g. processing,
trading or sourcing from artisanal miners or cooperatives should adopt a due dili-
gence and internal control system to assess risks in their supply chain." Id. Smaller
contractors down the chain are also to regularly assess the risks of labor standard
violations. Id. at 34.
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requires due diligence within China's own global mining supply chain,
including standards that seek to align domestic policies with ILO's core
labor standards on value chain management, human rights, labor issues,
and occupational health and safety.7
1. Enforcement of Chinese Labor Laws by Governments and
Trade Unions
Most countries, including China, have labor and employment laws,
as well as administrative agencies and courts to enforce such laws. Addi-
tionally, labor unions and worker legal clinics that detect, report, and seek
to remedy labor violations could provide great assistance in enforcement
efforts. Of course, enforcement is ineffective unless the national and
local government is committed to making it work at every level.
On paper, workers in the labor supply chains do have rights and
labor protections. In practice, there are recurring problems and legal
violations in labor supply chains since unscrupulous employers at the
contractor and subcontractor levels often "squeeze" the next contractor
down the line to a point where there is not enough money for the work-
ers, especially the workers from the countryside. Contractors cut corners
by not entering into required labor contracts that allow application of the
labor laws or by instituting substandard wage payments and workplace
standards. In short, many Chinese contractors, not merely foreign con-
tractors, are responsible for legal violations, and it is not currently clear
who may hold responsibility and who can remedy it.
Certainly, however, labor law violations could be reduced by a com-
bination of swift and consistent enforcement of laws against the violators
and against employers "up the chain," including the lead contractors.
In the status quo, there are governmental labor inspection agencies
that could ferret out these violators and punish them as well as provide
remedies to the workers.76 Also, in 2017, a new legislative "penalty" was
75. Though the Guidelines appear to be legally non-binding, it may be an in-
dication of China's apparent willingness to embrace ILO standards in its overseas
business arrangements. The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, and
Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC), which issued the Guidelines, pledged
to assist, evaluate, and report on companies' performance. Song, supra note 47. The
labor provisions can be found GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 47,
at33 38.
76. "On July 25, 2016, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
issued the Measures for the Rating of Enterprises' Labor Security Compliance ...
[wherein] the labor authorities will rate each company each year on [the company's]
compliance with labor [and] employment law requirement[s]." New Measures In-
crease Company Responsibility for Labor Unrest, BAKER & MCKENZIE NEWSLETTER
(Aug. 2016), http://bakerxchange.com/rv/ff002a17ab229804324cf8c3454580a83d4ce-
c3a/p 4618868 [https://perma.cc/SG7K-KCZP]. "[A]uthorities will gather informa-
tion about compliance through routine on-site inspections, document reviews, labor
complaints, etc. to determine whether the company complies with labor [laws]." Id.
The measures provide that "a company will receive a [low] rating if the company has
created labor conditions that give rise to collective unrest or other serious or negative
consequences for society." Id. Thereafter, there will be more frequent inspections,
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introduced -a "Name and Shame" law that publicizes labor law violators
and thereby damages MNCs reputations and sales back home."7 Like-
wise, better informed workers could alert the government agencies, and
the trade unions could be at the vanguard of this protection of Chinese
workers. Moreover, the imposition of joint liability and the creation of
legal duties to conduct due diligence-as many countries have imple-
mented -could help address these violations.
2. Domestic Regulation: Joint Liability by Statute and
Insurance
One alternative, as discussed earlier, would be for China to pass
legislation regulating labor supply chains within its borders. Australia
and numerous other countries, for example, have passed legislation to
mandate joint responsibility.78 Another alternative would be to amend
Article 94 of the LCL to include the MNCs' "leading companies" inside
China and hold them jointly liable for violations of labor laws by contrac-
tors in their supply chain).9 In modifying the law, consideration should
be given as to whether liability would be limited to wages or would also
include workers' injuries and social insurance benefits, which should be
provided to similarly situated workers who had been given or should
have been given a labor contract, as well as access to labor arbitration
and full benefits.
and requirements of future compliance. Id.
77 Dezan Shira et al., Name and Shame: Employers' Labor Law Violations to
Be Made Public in China, CHINA BRIEFING (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.china-briefing.
com/news/2016/10/20/name-shame-employers-labor-law-violations-made-public.htm
[https://perma.cc/QMH7-E69M]. "The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Se-
curity (MOHRSS) has issued provisions for labor and social security offences com-
mitted by employers to be made public." Id. The law is effective January 1, 2017, and
applies "to all companies operating in China that commit significant violations," and
attempts to provide a deterrent to companies who violate China's labor regulations.
Id.
The full name of the employer, address, social credit code or registration
number, name of legal representative, details of the violation and ver-
dict outcome will be made public by newspapers, magazines, television
and other such media each quarter at county level, and twice yearly at
provincial and national level. The information will also be published on
the MOHRSS Administration Department's online portal, and will be in-
cluded on an employer's integrity and legal compliance file, entered into
the MOHRSS credit system, and shared with other social organizations
and governmental departments.
Id.
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. Labor Contract Law, supra note 59, art. 94. Article 94 of the Labor Contract
Law establishes that individual contractors who are not qualified to serve as employ-
ers under Chinese labor laws must assume joint liability for any damages caused to
employees who the individual contractor hired. Id. The entity or company that con-
tracted the individual contractor also bears joint liability for damages to employees
who the individual contractor hired. Id.
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Statutory remedies imposing joint liabilities "up the chain" on com-
panies and contractors for non-payment of wages by subcontractors to
their workers is becoming more common-place in developed countries.
This joint liability is an attempt to address the global problem of com-
panies seeking to shift legal responsibilities to entities farther down the
chain in what has been described as "fissured" workplaces or labor sup-
ply chain networks. Creating "guarantor" liability would logically bring
greater efforts to deter violations, especially since the publicity attached
to the liability has business and reputational costs. The potential rem-
edy of imposing liability is said to have two effects0 : (1) to cause the
entity up the chain to use techniques designed to ensure compliance by
the subcontractor; and (2) to provide the worker wage payment relief, as




In Australia, a more innovative remedial approach is sometimes
used in determining liability "up the chain." Under its Fair Work Act
(FWO), Australia uses the "strategic enforcement" model put forward by
David Weil 2 and targets the lead company. Australia, under the FWO,
legally considers the lead company an "accessory" to the violations and
responsible for "sham" contracting when the lead company in the chain
knows that, to meet the offered contract price, the subcontractor will
likely need to shave costs by using below legal labor standards.
83
Another rather simple solution would be to have the MNC, its
leading company contractor, and/or its supply chain network contractors
create a payment bond, voluntarily by contract or by legislative mandate,
which would guarantee payment to workers for obligations due under
local labor laws. These bonds are common in the United States for public
projects,84 and such payment bonds are available for purchase in Chi-
na.85 Perhaps purchasing a payment bond could be required as part of a
80. Hardy & Howe, supra note 10, at 567.
81. Insurance, performance and payment bonds, etc. are common tools used and
included as a cost of business to manage their risks. In the U.S., while traditionally, em-
ployment practices liability policies have excluded coverage for wage and hour claims,
specialty wage and hour insurance products are now emerging as a form of added pro-
tection. Also, see discussion of remedies in BROWN, FTAs that Protect Workers, supra
note 34, at 132 33.
82. DAVID WEIL ET AL., IMPROVING WORKPLACE CONDITIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT 75 96 (2010).
83. See discussion in Hardy & Howe, supra note 10, at 583.
84. See, e.g., The Illinois Public Construction Bond Act 30 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550/1
(2006). Bonds are typically obligations issued by insurance companies guaranteeing
performance of contracts by contractors. Bonds are typically obligations issued by in-
surance companies guaranteeing performance of contracts by contractors. A payment
bond obligates the surety to pay subcontractors, material suppliers, and laborers the
amounts that the general contractor would have paid but for the general contractor's
default and/or insolvency. For further explanation of the utility of a payment bond,
see Robert J. Duke, Surety Bonds: The Best Way to Prevent Subcontractor Default,
CONSTRUCTION Bus. OWNER, July 2008, at 24.
85. Insurance companies freely advertise the usefulness and need for these
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business registration so as to ensure payment of wages by means of an
insurance contract.6 A related protection, common in the United States,
is to have mechanics lien legislation that protects workers against not
being paid by the contractor by giving the worker a property interest in
the goods worked on until the worker is paid. However, as discussed ear-
lier, a mechanic's lien would dramatically disrupt the flow of encumbered
bonds. For example, "AIG Insurance Company China Limited [formally Chartis Chi-
na] provides property and casualty insurance products for customers in China .... The
company provides business insurance solutions, such as ... surety bonds." Compa-
ny Overview of AIG Insurance Company China Limited, BLOOMBERG, https://www.
bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapld 35862952 [https://
perma.cc/EW99-9K7C]; The Surety Bond Market Is Growing in China, BOND-PRO,
http://www.bond-pro.com/blog/the-surety-bond-market-is-growing-in-china [https://
perma.cc/8BFQ-2SXF] ("[A] number of insurance companies have started offering
[surety bonds], and it is very much modelled towards the US surety market."). In the
early 2000s, a paper was published urging use of payment bonds and other bonds in
the construction industry. See Pengtao Zhang & Lixiang Wang, Research on Construc-
tion Surety Bond Types in Land Consolidation in China (unpublished article), at 741
http://www.seiofbluemountain.com/upload/product/201002/1265351470x6suqqmd.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G2H9-BVVM]. As early as 2000, when China was entering the
WBO, it was reported that
China is allowing foreign insurance companies to enter the domestic
surety-bond business, the weekend edition of the official China Daily said
Sunday. A surety bond is a three-party agreement among project owners,
building contractors and insurance firms. The insurance firms are usual-
ly property and casualty insurers. The bond will guard against payment
defaults as well as ensure on-time delivery by requiring the contractor
to comply with its schedule. There is currently only one surety company
in China, the state-owned Chang'an Surety Co., which has underwritten
surety bonds for domestic construction projects in major cities such as
Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. "Foreign surety and insurance compa-
nies are...encouraged to cooperate with domestic surety businesses and
project contractors, such as by offering reinsurance, which will distribute
more widely the risks involved in a big project," the newspaper said.
China Opens Surety-Bond Business to Foreign Insurance Companies,WALL STREET
J. (May 21, 2000, 8:11 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB958909973161584000
[https://perma.cc/ZFX6-YNC6].
86. Failure to obtain the proper business registration including the bond would
seem to trigger Art. 94 of the LCL, imposing joint liability "up the chain" with other
contractors. Another legislative approach used in the U.S. is a law requiring that the
wages prevailing in the area of the work must be paid to the workers. In the U.S.
there is a federal law and numerous state laws requiring this so-called prevailing wage
law, that is usually applicable to public projects. A 'prevailing wage' law regulates the
wages that must be paid on a particular project. In addition, most prevailing wage
laws prescribe how these rates are determined and provide sanctions and penalties
against those who violate the prevailing wage law by failing to pay the applicable rate.
In the United States there are in fact numerous laws which govern wage and hour
requirements on public and private construction projects. "On the federal level, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.
§ 276a et seq., are the most noteworthy." John W. Rourke et al., A Survey of Prevailing
Wage Laws and Their Implications for the Surety (unpublished article), http://www.
forcon.com/userfiles/file/nesfcc/2000/06.Rourke.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z76T-MM4B].
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goods in the labor supply chain,just as an injunction in the United States'
FLSA "hot cargo" provision would.
Alternatively, business insurance 1 or contractual guarantor provi-
sions, which would cover labor law violations such as unpaid wages, could
be required by law. While a trade union could negotiate such a term in
a collective bargaining agreement, similar to the old Unites States "job-
bers' agreements" establishing joint liability as previously discussed,
"jobbers' agreements" are not likely in China and would not necessarily
result in national coverage.
Depending on the type of remedy the Chinese Government pre-
scribes, if the remedy were not connected with a labor contract and its
access to labor arbitration, a method of enforcement would need to be
created and included that provided in-court enforcement, access to a
required fund set up by the MNC, or some other easy and efficient rem-
edy for the unpaid worker.
Of course, the easiest remedy is for China to be more proactive in
inspecting working conditions in the subcontractors' locations, enforcing
the existing labor rights of the labor supply chain workers, and expanding
the definitions of "workers" under the LCL to those who were not given
the required labor contracts.
3. Foreign Countries' Regulation of Overseas Labor Supply
Workers
As discussed, there would seem to be at least two avenues to regu-
late domiciled MNCs doing business overseas with labor supply chains.
The first is to use the extraterritorial application of home country laws
to regulate the conduct of overseas home country employers and place
duties on them. Domestic laws with extraterritorial application exist
in the U.S. and cover a number of areas, including the safety of food 8
and consumer products,9 corruption,90 and human trafficking.9' Still, the
access to rights may only be afforded to U.S. citizens, under legislation
87 "Traditionally, in the U.S., employment practices liability (EPL) policies
have excluded coverage for wage and hour claims. Directors and officers (D&O)
insurance also frequently excludes wage and hour claims from coverage. Specialty
wage and hour insurance products are now emerging as a form of added protection."
Britton D.Weimer, Webinar and Q & A:Wage and Hour Insurance Coverage: Mitigat-
ing Risk with EPL, D&O, and Emerging Specialty Wage and Hour Insurance Policies
(Aug. 17, 2016); see also, David A. Gauntlet, Insurance Coverage for Wage and Hour
Claims Under a Variety of Insurance Policies (Feb. 23, 2012) (manuscript at 16-22).
88. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
89. Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2089 (2008).
90. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977).
91. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, § 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. 1464,1486-88 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1591
(2008)); and enhanced by President Obama in Exec. Order No. 13,627, 77 Fed. Reg.
60029 (Oct. 1, 2012) wherein federal contractors and subcontractors must contractu-
ally agree to allow compliance audits and investigations for anti-trafficking activities.
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such as Title Seven of the Civil Rights Law.92 But domestic laws also can
go beyond that to require contractual commitments by the foreign con-
tractors. While this new form of outsourcing supply chain regulation has
worthy goals of legal conduct overseas, it has some downsides, as pointed
out by Professor Sarfaty9 3:
Domestic regulations on supply chains pose a unique compliance
challenge to companies because these laws operate extraterritorial-
ly. Multinational companies are more than just regulated entities;
they now also serve as regulators themselves, imposing standards on
their third-party suppliers in other countries .... While the outsourc-
ing of supply chain regulations may create opportunities for states
to govern firms abroad typically outside their reach, this practice
raises accountability concerns. Supply chain laws transfer authority
from regulators to private actors who are responsible for implemen-
tation and who may then further outsource to private consultants.
Assigning private parties the role of implementing regulation is con-
cerning given the lack of government oversight and transparency to
the public.
94
The second avenue for improving labor supply chain operations
through domestic regulations would be to require disclosure of all the
contractors and subcontractors in the chain, which would help identi-
fy the actual employers of the labor supply chain workers and expose
them for further inspection by the government and non-governmen-
tal organizations. Also, MNCs operating overseas could be required to
upgrade their CSRs and codes of conduct and mandate obligations and
real grievance arbitration provisions already required of all MNC con-
tractors. In addition, MNCs operating overseas could perhaps require
payment bonds down the chain from all contractors and subcontractors
in the labor supply chain as part of doing business up the chain.
There are many innovative remedies available to look after the
workers lowest down the labor supply chain, and many remedies could
be implemented to match the rhetoric of the CEOs who say they are try-
ing their best to provide decent working conditions all the way down the
chain. As indicated above, there are legal approaches already being used
in many countries to provide some relief and remedies for these workers.95
92. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991);
Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat. 327 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp.V 2011)) ("ADA"); see EEOC, Enforce-
ment Guidance, supra note 38.
93. See Sarfaty, supra note 36, at 427 29.
94. Id. at 421,437
95. Professor Jennifer Gordon has assembled many of these legal theories for
the ILO and has urged adoption of the joint liability approach.
Actors higher up the supply chain can be brought into a joint liability
regime in different ways, as the case studies demonstrate: A law in the
destination country can make employers legally and financially responsi-
ble if their recruiters violate the standards. . . A law in the origin coun-
try can require the employer to sign a contract agreeing to joint liability
for recruitment abuses before hiring workers from that country. This is
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B. Anticipating Changing Labor Supply Chains Affected by Made in
China 2025s Robotization
With declining and aging labor pools in China,96 many MNCs oper-
ating their labor supply chains in China must anticipate the possible labor
shortages and determine if their business will benefit from China's cur-
rent push to robotize certain manufacturing industries by 2025.17 While it
is unclear whether the impact of robotization and digitalization will off-
set rising wages and displace the need for large numbers of cheaply paid
workers in the manufacturing processes, one thing is certain: Many of the
traditional labor supply chains, which have labor and economic issues yet
to be sorted out, will need to be reconfigured.98 One such reconfigura-
tion is for MNCs to manufacture at home with "cheap-labor-robots" and
eliminate the overseas manufacturing part of their supply chain.
MNCs might also relocate their labor supply chains. While some
MNCs have already relocated from China to countries with lower wages
such as Vietnam, some studies show Chinese workers' productivity often
unlikely to be successful unless there is active enforcement in both the
origin and destination country.
GORDON, supra note 9, at 45.
96. "The magnitude of change is astonishing if we consider that, as of 2010,
China had a surplus of 150 million laborers. The net reduction in the nation's labor
supply from 2010 to 2025, according to this study, could be close to 180 million." How
Can China Address its Looming Labor Crisis?, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 2013), http://for-
tune.com/2013/02/06/how-can-china-address-its-coming-labor-crisis [https://perma.
cc/6F3Z-V8CL]. It is reported that people
between 15 and 24 are "the cheapest, most mobile and flexible in the
Chinese workforce," but their numbers have been declining since 2005,
a situation that has led to significant wage growth and demand outstrip-
ping supply. UN data show there were 225 million people in this age
group in 2010. By 2025, the number will fall by nearly 30 percent to 164
million. And in 2050, it will shrink to 124 million. A cheap and young
labor force that gave China its reputation as the manufacturing capital of
the world is fast eroding. Plus, China's youth are now reluctant to take up
low-paying factory jobs that come with long working hours under tough
conditions.
Deirdre Wang Morris, China's Aging Population Threatens Its Manufacturing
Might, CNBC (Oct. 24, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49498720 [https://per-
ma.cc/W8QQ-NWUH].
97 Scott Kennedy, Made in China 2025, Ctr. for Strategic & Int'l Stud. (Jun. 1,
2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025 [https://perma.cc/7FRC-DKTF].
98. "China is laying the groundwork for a robot revolution by planning to
automate the work currently done by millions of low-paid workers." Will Knight,
China Wants to Replace Millions of Workers with Robots, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 7,
2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/544201/china-wants-to-replace-millions-
of-workers-with-robots [https://perma.cc/ESK9-DHDQ]. China's domestic recon-
figurations are already making China manufactured products competitive with the
products of the foreign MNCs. See Melissa Twigg, China's Factory Brands: Clones or
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offsets some of the perceived benefits of relocating.99 With the assistance
of robots and fewer workers needed for production, one might envision
a re-make of the labor supply chain into a more contractually-based and
controlled subcontracting system that could efficiently mobilize the nec-
essary labor without labor strikes and low production during the holidays.
With such a reconfiguration,joint responsibility could become more
acceptable as an efficient way to fix substandard treatment of workers
while still permitting mass production. If joint liability is implement-
ed, perhaps with additional requirements of payment bonds, etc., better
labor conditions can be a normal and socially responsible cost of busi-
ness and a "fulfillment of promises" beyond the often-illusory CSRs and
codes of conduct.
CONCLUSION
China may want to consider reforms that better protect its citizens
working in the labor supply chains of MNCs. There are legal approach-
es for regulating the foreign entities that operate in concert with Chinese
entrepreneurs while still allowing profits and promoting fair dealing.
Some approaches are implemented through domestic laws in China,
while other approaches use laws in the foreign MNCs' home countries.
To underscore the depths of the problem of unprotected labor sup-
ply chain workers, the ITUC reported that ninety-four percent of the top
MNC labor supply chain workers do not have a direct employment rela-
tionship with the MNC but are contracted out to shift legal responsibility
to their contractors in the chain.' Moreover, in June 2016, the ILO con-
ducted a global conference to develop legal standards that would address
the needs of global labor supply chain workers, and the ILO concluded
that "current ILO standards may not ... achieve decent work [condi-
tions] in global supply chains."''
99. Still Made in China, supra note 12.
100. The International Trade Union Congress (ITUC) issued a
report [that] analyzed the global supply chains of fifty multinationals in
U.S., Europe, and Asia including McDonalds, Wal-Mart, H&M, Samsung
and Apple. Only six percent of the employees on the global supply chains
of these fifty multinationals, with combined revenue of $ 3.4 trillion, are
in a direct employment relationship with the multi-national brand. And
of the other 94%, many are employed as contract workers in violation
of the national laws of the countries where they work. The ITUC is spe-
cifically calling on the multinational brands to accept joint responsibility
for minimum living wages, health and safety, and collective bargaining.
Jennifer Rosenbaum, Guest Post: 2016 Steps Forward on Joint Employer Liabil-
ity, ON LAB. (Feb. 2, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/02/02/guest-post-2016-steps-for-
ward-on-joint-employer-liability [https://perma.cc/3HL6-NRPY]. For discussion on
the elusive and changing definition of employer, see JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT
OF THE EMPLOYER (2015).
101. Decent Work in Supply Chains, supra note 4, at no. 25. The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) (Guiding Principle 2) under-
scores this need, stating "all 'States should set out clearly the expectation that all
business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human
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In taking action, China could require "good citizenship" and fair
dealing, just as it does for its own employers in foreign lands through its
Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments. If
that proves as ineffective as voluntary CSRs and codes of conduct, then
China should mandate it for the foreign MNCs. And, if it is obvious that
Chinese MNCs create the same issues in China down the labor supply
chain, China should require its Chinese MNCs to adhere to good citizen-
ship and fair dealing requirements domestically as well. MNCs supply
chain workers are still victims in the same way, notwithstanding the fund-
ing source of the projects.
Additionally, China could take a politically gentle approach by
incrementally requiring greater transparency and the listing of all con-
tractors and subcontractors used in the labor supply chains. California
disclosure laws, for example, require similar listing, and listing of contrac-
tors could alert local labor bureaus and help ensure that labor contracts
have been issued, which would better enable the workers to use the labor
arbitration system for redress of violations.
Foreign governments can also lessen the impact of exploitative
MNCs that routinely outsource labor supply chain systems and use the
most vulnerable workers to maximize profits by better regulating MNC's
overseas operations.
The time for reconfiguration of labor supply chains is fast-approach-
ing. It is time for governments, Chinese and foreign, to be innovative
and to remove the competitive advantage that MNCs derive from using
underpaid chain workers. In the status quo, the internal self-help tools
of CSRs and codes of conduct are not protecting those workers at the far
end of the chain. To improve treatment of workers, MNCs must begin to
share joint responsibility for the labor conditions in their supply chains,
and not just share in the profits.
rights through-out their operations.' This includes workers' rights in the supply chain."
Global Supply Chains and Decent Work Trade Union Input to the G7, INT'L TRADE
UNION CONFEDERATION (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/tu paper
for g7 2015.pdf [https://perma.ccV2XN-R9YR].
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